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Abstract
Fault tolerance is an important challenge for supporting
critical big data analytic operations. Most existing solu-
tions only provide fault tolerant data replication, requir-
ing failed queries to be restarted. This approach is in-
su cient for long-running time-sensitive analytic queries,
due to lost query progress. Several solutions provide intra-
query fault tolerance. However, these focus on distributed
or row-oriented databases and are not suitable for use with
the column-oriented in-memory databases increasingly used
for high-performance workloads. We propose a new ap-
proach for intra-query checkpointing that produces an opti-
mal checkpoint solution for a fixed checkpointing budget to
minimise overhead on in-memory column-oriented database
clusters. We describe a modified architecture for fault tol-
erant query execution using this approach. We present a
general model for the problem, in which an adversary is
free to terminate the execution of the query, eliminating all
unsaved work. We present an algorithm that represents a
first step towards producing checkpoint plans by optimally
placing a single checkpoint. Our analysis shows this ap-
proach allows reduced checkpoint overheads while providing
resilience for long-running queries.
1 Introduction
In-memory databases are high-performance databases that
maintain all or a large proportion of data in main mem-
ory for their operation [1]. In-memory databases are usu-
ally column-oriented to leverage cache friendly memory ac-
cess patterns. Such databases are increasingly used for big
data analytics in industrial and scientific settings due to
the performance benefits of reduced disk access overheads
incurred with conventional databases [7]. Katal et al. iden-
tify fault tolerance as an important technical challenge for
big data systems [10]. The fault tolerance approach of both
conventional and in-memory database solutions largely fo-
cuses on various schemes for achieving the durability of the
database through methods such as transaction logging and
table snapshots [8]. In such solutions, fault tolerance of run-
ning queries relies on replicas of the database being avail-
able to allow a failed query to be restarted elsewhere. How-
ever, this approach results in all progress towards the result
of such a query being lost, which can cause a significant
increase in latency for long-running time-sensitive queries.
Some approaches solve this by running multiple instances
of important queries [2]. This increases the probability that
some queries will run to completion at the cost of consuming
more energy and requiring additional hardware.
While there are existing solutions that provide fault tol-
erance for running database queries [15, 12, 14, 4], these
approaches are not suitable for use by in-memory column-
store database systems either due to limitations in complex-
ity of supported query plans or high overheads due to the
large and varying memory profile of in-memory databases
[3].
We propose a selective checkpointing mechanism towards
providing e cient intra-query fault tolerance suited to in-
memory database systems in a replicated cluster. Our ap-
proach leverages the intermediate data produced during the
execution of a query plan and aims to produce checkpoint
plans that more e↵ectively use a fixed checkpointing bud-
get than available alternatives. In-memory databases often
fully materialise these intermediates, so no extra resources
are consumed to produce this data. This approach allows
all nodes within the cluster to be primarily focused on nor-
mal productive work and does not require any idle or non-
productive backup nodes.
Our general model for reasoning about this problem con-
sists of a bipartite directed acyclic graph (DAG) represent-
ing operations and data involved in parallel computations
as well as providing a well defined order of execution. This
model represents an approach that, unlike previous work,
imposes no limitations on query plans, and is applicable to
other models of computation. We also include an abridged
version of this model that only considers the data dependen-
cies for convenience of reasoning about checkpoint plans.
We envision that our mechanism will produce e↵ective
fault tolerance in many failure scenarios. In this paper, we
take a first step towards implementing our mechanism by
developing an algorithm for checkpoint planning. We be-
lieve our algorithm is the first to take a global approach to
selecting an optimal single checkpoint from database query
plan graphs. We analyse the algorithm, proving its cor-
rectness and complexity, and provide some preliminary re-
sults to its e↵ectiveness compared to a naive checkpointing
scheme. We suggest that our approach of e↵ectively using
a fixed checkpointing budget will reduce checkpoint over-
head, as shown by the impact of a single optimally placed
checkpoint.
The main contributions of our work are:
• A selective checkpointing mechanism for a replicated
cluster of in-memory databases
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• A novel general model for reasoning about query plans
and producing checkpoint plans that treats all proper-
ties topologically
• An algorithm for selecting a single, optimal checkpoint
from a query plan graph
• Theoretical analysis of our algorithm with proofs for
its complexity and correctness
The layout of this paper is as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes related work and contrasts the state of the art solu-
tions against our approach. Section 3 describes an existing
system architecture and our proposed modifications (Sec-
tion 3.1), a general model of computation that describes
query plan graphs (Section 3.2), the execution of query plan
graphs (Section 3.4) and the abridged model used by our
algorithm (Section 3.3). Section 4 describes our algorithm,
which is then analysed in Section 5, providing a proof of
complexity and correctness. Section 6.1 describes the setup
used to produce the preliminary results we discuss in Sec-
tion 6.2. Finally, we give our conclusions in Section 7.
2 Related Work
As discussed in Section 1, most database fault tolerance
approaches focus on achieving durability [8]. Fault tolerance
for queries is generally provided by cluster-based solutions
that facilitate parallel or repeat execution of failed queries
on another node [2].
In solutions that employ complete re-execution in the case
of failures, the performance of executing normal queries is
important as improving this also impacts the repeated ex-
ecution. However, these solutions are not su cient for our
specific scenario as we consider exceptionally long-running
queries where trivial re-execution of failed queries is not
suitable, even with performance improvements.
Ivanova et al. [9] describe an in-memory database solu-
tion for increasing the performance of TPC-H queries by
reusing intermediate results produced during the execution
of queries. This work demonstrates the power of using
the materialised intermediate data featured in in-memory
databases.
Li et al. [11] describe a method for denormalising
database schemas that allows significant performance im-
provements for TPC-H queries over existing in-memory
database solutions. This solution extends existing perfor-
mance benefits of in-memory databases and shows that in
many cases checkpointing is unnecessary since the cost of
re-executing failed queries is insignificant.
We primarily consider solutions that provide intra-query
fault tolerance, which can potentially address the issue of re-
peated e↵ort by providing high-availability for long-running
queries not provided by parallel or retry execution strate-
gies. Reducing this repeated e↵ort will enable faster execu-
tion of a query under failure conditions while using fewer
resources than other strategies. This should provide a sig-
nificant cost improvement to highly available big data solu-
tions, as hardware can be more e↵ectively utilised.
Remus [5] is a virtualisation-based solution that continu-
ously checkpoints the CPU, I/O and main memory state of
a virtual machine to another hypervisor. Upon failure of the
original host, the virtual machine is automatically migrated
and resumed from the last checkpoint. A database running
on such a system would, as a result, inherit intra-query fault
tolerance as all state is saved. However, this solution has
some significant disadvantages. Firstly, a secondary host
capable of storing the entire state of the protected virtual
machine is required, which is a significant expense for in-
memory databases each with large main memory. Addi-
tionally, the memory of this secondary host cannot be used
productively as it has to remain idle to receive checkpoints.
Finally, the overhead for a database system will be signif-
icant due to the quantity of memory modifications in the
processing of queries that need to be checkpointed.
RemusDB [12] provides a solution to the significant check-
pointing overhead of using Remus with database systems by
modifying the database to become aware of the checkpoint-
ing. RemusDB flags memory pages used by the database
that may not be checkpointed if they can be trivially re-
stored later, reducing the checkpoint overhead by incurring
a greater cost on restart to regenerate unsaved data. This
mechanism is not able to di↵erentiate between queries, re-
sulting in greater overheads compared to checkpoint selec-
tion schemes as either all or no intermediate results must
be checkpointed.
Osprey [15] describes a first step towards intra-query
checkpointing, implementing a MapReduce-like [6] system
for data warehouse databases. However, this system check-
points every intermediate to disk for all subqueries, intro-
ducing a significant overhead. Additionally, the Osprey
work only considers support for query plans that are trees
operating within star schema data warehousing databases.
This schema is restricted to business intelligence applica-
tions, and does not extend to general relational database
applications.
FTOpt [14] develops a framework for selecting fault
tolerance mechanisms for each operator within a query
plan. This selectivity includes not saving or checkpoint-
ing the output of a particular operation, instead having re-
execution of selected subqueries, thus removing the need to
save potentially large intermediates. While this approach
is more generally applicable than that of Osprey, it is still
limited to tree-like query plans.
Chen and Taura [4] describe ParaLite, a distributed
shared-nothing relational database system in which they
implement intra-query fault tolerance using selective check-
pointing employing a divide and conquer approach to de-
cide whether an intermediate should be checkpointed. This
approach relies on the assumption that a checkpoint de-
cision for a particular node is only dependent on its suc-
cessors. We suggest that this assumption does not hold
for column-oriented database query plans that have a much
greater sharing of intermediate results than row-oriented
query plans. Leveraging this, we believe a global approach
can achieve more e cient placement of checkpoints within
a query plan.
3 Model
This section describes an existing architectural approach
to database fault tolerance that uses a cluster of repli-
cated database nodes, along with our proposed extension
to this system. It additionally contains our models describ-
ing query plans and their execution.
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3.1 System Architecture
3.1.1 Existing approach
A common existing approach consists of a cluster of read-
only database nodes that each have a full copy of the data
set. Multiple clients submit Online Analytical Processing
(OLAP) queries to a load-balancing database middleware
that assigns a node from a cluster. Once assigned to a
node, a query is executed in parallel on this node, as would
be the case if the database were used independently. The
result is then returned to the client via the middleware. This
approach is beneficial as it requires little to no modification
of the underlying database implementation to support. An
example of this approach is RAIDb [2], which provides this
functionality to multiple databases engines through JDBC.
Should a failure occur, the middleware may decide to
transparently retry the query on another node, or the client
will be notified by the middleware and must resubmit it for
execution. In either scenario, any progress towards the pro-
duction of the result made by the previously selected node
will be lost and the query is restarted from scratch.
3.1.2 Proposed extension
We propose augmenting the middleware and databases
within the previously described approach with the capabil-
ity to create and resume from partial checkpoints created
from the execution of a query. This will address the prob-
lem of the increased query latency experienced in the case
of a failure of a node in the cluster.
A database node executing a query will produce a check-
point plan for selected query plans, which indicates a set
of intermediate results created during the execution of the
query that should be saved. Databases will execute queries
as before but additionally save results as indicated by the
checkpoint plan. These partial checkpoints will be made
available to the middleware either through being directly
transmitted over the network, or being saved to a persis-
tent shared storage solution.
For in-memory databases, these checkpoints can be cre-
ated by directly saving the materialised intermediate data
structures that are generated during the normal execution
of queries in such databases. This means that it is not
necessary to explicitly materialise the intermediate results,
reducing the potential performance impact of our solution.
Ivanova et al. demonstrated successful use of the mate-
rialised intermediates created by in-memory databases to
improve execution performance [9].
If the node executing the query should fail, another
database node within the cluster will be automatically se-
lected to finish the query by the middleware, based on its
normal load-balancing strategies. This node will be sent
the partial checkpoints, query plan, and initial parameters
from the failed query and execution will resume and exe-
cute to completion on the replacement before returning the
answer to the client via the middleware. Optionally, to pro-
tect against multiple failures, the checkpoint plan may also
be transmitted and the new database node will continue to
save new checkpoints as they are produced.
Incomplete checkpoints are considered invalid and are ig-
nored. If a database node fails during the transmission of
a checkpoint, this incomplete checkpoint will be discarded
and the system will operate as if it was not transmitted.
Figure 1: Example of query plan graph structure from Mon-
etDB for query “select count(*) from example;” on a
simple table with an integer primary key
A key requirement of this solution is the ability to se-
lect a subset of intermediate results from the query plan to
be checkpointed. The selection of this subset should aim
to limit the overhead of the checkpointing mechanism by
selecting fewer, smaller intermediates where possible, but
also to minimise the execution time of the restarted query.
This selection is di cult as an approach potentially has to
consider all possible subsets of vertices, as well as all possi-
ble failure positions of the query execution when using each
candidate checkpoint subset.
3.2 Query Plans
A query plan describes the actions to be performed to pro-
duce the result for a given query in a database system.
Query plans take di↵erent forms depending on the specific
database implementation, but all can be modelled as DAGs.
Query plans are generated from SQL queries and opti-
mised by one or more database query optimisers. Queries
that will be reused can be declared as prepared statements.
Query plans are usually cached for long periods of time and
do not change. Automatic query optimisation may involve
di↵erent goals, such as minimising run-time or achieving a
consistent average case performance. Query plans may ad-
ditionally be manually tweaked by database administrators
using specific knowledge of workload and data distribution
to achieve more desirable execution characteristics.
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Generally a query can be described as being built from
two primary components - a statement and parameters.
The statement represents the general form of the query,
and is used to construct the query plan. An example query
plan graph is shown in Figure 1. The statement may use
placeholders for variable parameters that will be provided
at query execution time. Prepared statements enable re-
use of the same query plan with di↵erent parameters. At
run-time these placeholders are substituted with values pro-
vided from the query parameters provided to the prepared
statement. In a query plan graph, these vertices, as well as
vertices representing the data stored in the database itself,
are used as the initial data vertices from which to begin
execution of the query.
3.2.1 General Query Plans
Query plans (as well as many computations in general) can
be represented as a bipartite directed acyclic graph, G. In
these graphs, the set of vertices, V , are one of two types, Vop
or Vdata, representing either operations or data respectively.
Each vertex has a weight with di↵erent meaning depend-
ing on its type. The weight of operation vertices, time(Vop),
represents the time required for the operation to be per-
formed. The weight of data vertices, size(Vdata), represents
their size and the amount of memory they consume. This
size is also proportional to the cost of checkpointing a partic-
ular vertex, as transmitting more data consumes additional
resources.
The set of directed edges, E, in the graph represent
the dependency relationship between the operations and
data. Data vertices represent data items such as the orig-
inal columns, query parameters, intermediate results, and
the final result to be returned to the client. Operation ver-
tices represent relational algebra operations performed on
the data, such as selects or joins.
G = (V,E)
V = Vdata [ Vop
E ✓ { (v, w) | v, w 2 V ^
v 2 Vdata =) w 2 Vop ^
w 2 Vdata =) v 2 Vop }
Each operation may have zero or more incoming data
vertices, and may have zero or more output data vertices.
Vertices with no ancestors are considered roots, and ver-
tices with no descendants are considered leaves. There is a
single root data vertex representing the database state and
query parameters, and a single leaf data vertex represent-
ing the query result. During the execution of a query plan,
an operation can only be performed if all its incoming data
vertices have already been produced. This is described in
more detail in Section 3.4.
An example query plan graph for a simple query is shown
in Figure 1. This shows some of the operations a query will
be built from, such as SQL catalogue access and low-level
relational algebra functions performed on columns.
3.3 Abridged Query Plans
Section 3.2 describes a general model of computation that
describes query plans. However, for the purposes of select-
ing data vertices within these query plans for checkpointing,
a simpler graph representation composed of only the data
vertices simplifies processing and reasoning.
This abridged query plan graph, G0, is still a DAG but
no longer bipartite, as operation vertices from the full query
plan are omitted. The set of vertices in this graph, V 0, are
instead data vertices from the original graph with edges, E0,
based on their indirect dependency relationships inherited
from the original graph. This change allows algorithms to
more conveniently consider the elements of the graph that
can be checkpointed, and the relations between them.
The remaining vertices retain their original data vertex
weights, representing only intermediate size. Edge weights
are now used to represent execution time are derived from
the weights of the operation vertices from which the edges
are derived.
G0 = (V 0, E0)
V 0 = Vdata
E0 = { (v, z) | v, z 2 Vdata ^
w 2 Vop ^
(v, w), (w, z) 2 E ^
time((v, z)) = time(w) }
3.4 Execution Model
For this work we consider the execution of a single query
within the replicated cluster architecture described previ-
ously. We assume that queries are executed in parallel on
a single database node (i.e. execution is not distributed
across the cluster), selected by the load-balancing middle-
ware. It is assumed that each database node has an infinite
number of cores and that the time taken per operation and
the size of an intermediate are both constant. When any
data vertex that is marked to be checkpointed is produced
during the execution of the query it will be asynchronously
transmitted to the middleware.
To execute an operation, all of its dependencies must have
been produced. As such, all data in the graph must be
produced to calculate the result of the query. To avoid
ambiguity as to when an operation is executed, we assume
each operation in the query plan is performed as soon as
all of its dependencies have been produced. Therefore, the
execution time is equal to the weighted length of the critical
path, as this will be the limiting factor in producing the final
vertex.
Definition 1. A critical path is a longest sequence of
operations in the query plan. This is equivalent to a longest
edge-weighted path in the abridged query plan graph.
Adversary Strategy We consider the problem of crash
failures of entire database nodes within our system during
the execution of a single query. In such an event, the failure
is detected by the middleware and a di↵erent database node
is selected to re-execute the query. If any checkpoints were
successfully created in the original execution, these are also
transferred to the newly selected node.
During the execution of a single query in this model, an
adversary may choose any point in the execution to trigger
the failure of the node that it is executing on. We con-
sider an adversary that, with full knowledge of the query
and checkpoint plans, chooses to place a single failure to
cause the worst-case execution time for the given query and
checkpoint plan.
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Execution time in the presence of a single failure
The total execution time for a query in the presence of
a single failure can be calculated as the sum of the time
spent executing the query before the failure, and the time
to re-execute the query to completion. If no checkpoint is
available, the query must be re-executed in is entirety. The
worst-case failure without a checkpoint would be to fail im-
mediately before finishing, as this will cause the entire graph
to be executed twice.
If a checkpoint is available, the re-execution time of the
graph can be reduced. Operations dependent on a check-
pointed data vertex may be able to execute sooner. Ad-
ditionally, some operations and their intermediate results
may no longer be necessary at all if they were only used in
the production of the checkpoint. The execution time of the
graph when using a checkpoint is equivalent to the execu-
tion time of a new graph where the checkpointed vertex is
removed, along with any of its ancestors that are no longer
reachable from the leaf of the graph.
Observation 1. The total execution time with a single fail-
ure occurring before a checkpoint could be produced is equal
to the sum of the amount of time spent executing the query
before the failure and the uninterrupted execution time of
the whole query.
Observation 2. The total execution time with a single fail-
ure occurring after a checkpoint was produced is equal to the
sum of the amount of time spent executing the query before
the failure and the uninterrupted execution time of the whole
query when beginning with the checkpointed data.
Returning to the example of the query plan in Figure 1,
consider a failure after the algebra.projection operation with
d 6 being checkpointed. The re-execution of this query will
only consist of three sequential operations producing the
data vertices d 1, d 7 and d 8 (the query result). Note that
d 0 is still required to produce d 1, but d 2, d 3, d 4 and
d 5 are no longer required as d 6 was checkpointed and does
not need to be reproduced.
4 Algorithm
To implement the checkpointing mechanism described in
Section 3.1 we need a method of producing a checkpoint
plan - a set of data vertices that should be saved during
the execution of a query. As a first step towards this, we
consider the production of checkpoint plans consisting of a
single vertex to be checkpointed.
Definition 2. A single checkpoint is a data vertex from
a query plan to be saved during the execution of a query
that will be the only vertex checkpointed and used during
re-execution in the event of a failure.
Definition 3. An e↵ective single checkpoint, veff , is
any single checkpoint that will reduce the execution time of
the query in the event of a single failure over simply re-
running the query from the start. There is a (potentially
empty) set, Veff , of e↵ective single checkpoints, which each
have the same worst-case execution time.
V 0e↵ = { ve↵ 2 V 0 |
time(ve↵) < distance(G
0, leaf(G0)) ⇥ 2 }
Algorithm 1 Single Checkpoint Selection Algorithm
1: function checkpointSelection(G)
2: best 1
3: candidates ?
4: Pc  a critical path of G
5: Gdepth  length of Pc
6: l leaf vertex of Pc
7: for v 2 Pc do
8: costbefore  Gdepth+ LPATH(G, v,?)
9: costafter  Gdepth+ LPATH(G, l, {v})
10: cost MAX(costbefore, costafter)
11: if cost < best then
12: best cost
13: candidates v
14: else if cost = best then
15: candidates candidates [ v
16: end if
17: end for
18: return candidates
19: end function
Definition 4. An optimal single checkpoint is any sin-
gle checkpoint that results in the smallest possible worst-
case execution time of the query when used in the event of
a single failure.
V 0opt = { vopt 2 V 0 | ¬9 v 2 V 0 •
time(v) < time(vopt) }
The rest of this section describes our algorithm, which
produces all optimal e↵ective single checkpoint plans (if any
exist) for arbitrary query plan graphs. To discuss the al-
gorithm, we consider only the abridged query plan graphs
described in Section 3.3.
Search candidate vertices The algorithm, summarised
in Algorithm 1, consists of a search that calculates the
worst-case execution time in the event of a single failure
(the cost). A naive approach would calculate this cost for
every vertex in the graph. However, this search space can
be minimised by checking only vertices that lie within a
critical path of the graph, as e↵ective single checkpoints
must belong to the critical path, as shown in Lemma 1. As
such only the vertices within the critical path have the cost
calculated.
We then calculate the cost for each candidate vertex
tracking the set of vertices observed with the same mini-
mum score. We make no attempt to further di↵erentiate
between single checkpoints that have an equal worst-case
execution time, and one may be selected randomly from
the set to use.
Cost calculation A naive approach for calculating the
worst-case execution time for a particular checkpoint can-
didate would have to consider every vertex in the graph as
a potential failure location. However, for plans consisting
of a single checkpoint, the worst-case failure can only occur
in two positions - directly before the checkpoint would be
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Subroutine 1 Augmented longest path
1: function LPATH(G, x, exclusions)
2: depths ?
3: for v 2 topological ordering of v 2 G do
4: if v 2 exclusions then
5: depths[v] 0
6: else if 9 n 2 V • (n, v) 2 E then
7: depths[v]  MAX({depths[n]|(n, v) 2 E})
+time(n, v)
8: else
9: depths[v] 0
10: end if
11: if v = x then
12: return depths[v]
13: end if
14: end for
15: end function
saved or before completing the query, with the worst-case
being the larger cost of failing in these two locations.
The cost of failing before creating a checkpoint is the
sum of the cost of running the entire query once without
any checkpoints (i.e. longest path to the leaf of the graph),
and the amount of work that was lost due to the failure (i.e.
the longest path to the checkpoint minus one).
The cost of failing before returning the result is the sum
of the cost of running the entire query once without any
checkpoints and the cost of re-running the query using the
checkpoint, which must avoid computing vertices that are
no longer required due to the checkpoint itself.
The calculation of these execution times requires calcu-
lating the longest weighted path from the root to a given
vertex in the graph, for which there is a well known algo-
rithm. This algorithm calculates the distance to vertices in
the graph using a topological ordering, so that each vertex
and edge need only be visited once. However, our problem
additionally requires the calculation of the execution time
that would result from using the checkpoint.
This can be calculated by transforming the graph to re-
move the checkpoint and its redundant ancestors, and then
calculating the longest path as before. However, our longest
path subroutine (Subroutine 1) extends the well known
longest path algorithm to achieve this e↵ect without re-
quiring the transformation. This method retains the time
complexity of the conventional algorithm. Our modification
of the algorithm consists of the addition of lines 4 and 5,
which checks if the vertex is a checkpoint and as a result
should not be considered in the path length.
No optimal e↵ective checkpoints If there exist no ef-
fective single checkpoints, all single checkpoints are then by
definition optimal. In this case our algorithm will not re-
turn all optimal checkpoints, as it only searches the critical
path, and so instead returns all vertices in the critical path.
This satisfies the weaker guarantee that the algorithm will
always return a non-empty subset of optimal checkpoints.
5 Analysis
In this section we prove the correctness and complexity of
our single checkpoint algorithm.
5.1 Correctness
We aim to show that our algorithm will produce all optimal
e↵ective single checkpoints when any exist. If no e↵ective
checkpoints exist, it will return every vertex in the critical
path. In this case we do not perform any checkpoint as
there is no benefit in doing so.
Search As the algorithm only searches a single critical
path for potential checkpoints we must first show that all
potential e↵ective checkpoints will lie within the searched
vertices.
Lemma 1. All e↵ective single checkpoints lie on a critical
path.
Proof. The execution time of a query is defined by the
length of the critical path of the query plan graph. An
e↵ective checkpoint will reduce the execution time of the
query. If a single checkpoint is placed outside the critical
path it will not reduce the execution time as all vertices
on the critical path must still be produced. As such, an
e↵ective single checkpoint must be placed within a critical
path.
Lemma 2. All e↵ective single checkpoints lie within the
intersection of the vertices on all critical paths.
Proof. If a single checkpoint is placed in a critical path ver-
tex that is not a member of all critical paths, then the ex-
ecution time will not be reduced as the other critical paths
must still have all their vertices produced. Therefore, only
vertices that are on all critical paths will reduce the execu-
tion time when used as a single checkpoint.
Corollary 1. A graph with multiple critical paths and an
empty intersection of vertices will have no e↵ective single
checkpoints.
Lemma 3. If any e↵ective single checkpoints exist, all opti-
mal single checkpoints will be a subset of the set of e↵ective
single checkpoints.
Proof. Optimal single checkpoints are those that provide
the best worst-case execution time of all potential single
checkpoints. All non-e↵ective single checkpoints will have a
greater worst-case execution time than an e↵ective one.
Lemma 4. All e↵ective optimal single checkpoints lie
within the intersection of the vertices on all critical paths.
Proof. As per Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. Our algorithm considers all vertices that are
potential candidates for e↵ective single checkpoint.
Proof. The assignment in line 4 and iteration in line 7 of
Algorithm 1 considers all vertices on a single critical path.
This will include all vertices that appear in any intersection
of the critical path vertices, and as per Lemma 4, these are
the only vertices that are candidates for being e↵ective and
optimal.
This demonstrates that our algorithm considers all poten-
tial candidates that may form the set of e↵ective optimal
single checkpoints.
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Cost calculation We must also show that our algorithm
correctly calculates the worst-case execution time of the
candidate vertices it considers.
Lemma 6. The worst-case failure before a single checkpoint
is produced will occur immediately before a checkpoint would
be produced.
Proof. The execution time will be maximised in a worst-
case failure. In Observation 1 the total execution time of
the graph from the start is fixed, so the amount of lost work
must be maximised. This will occur at the furthest point
from the root of the graph without taking a checkpoint.
This point is maximised at the vertices before the single
checkpoint.
Lemma 7. The worst-case failure that can occur after a
single checkpoint is produced will be immediately before the
query result is produced.
Proof. The execution time will be maximised in a worst-
case failure. In Observation 2 the total execution time of
the graph from the start using the checkpoint is fixed, so the
amount of lost work must be maximised. This will occur at
the furthest point from the checkpoint of the graph. This
point is maximised at last vertex in the graph.
Lemma 8. Subroutine 1 correctly calculates the execution
time considering the use of a given checkpoint.
Proof. The subroutine is an extension to the known algo-
rithm for calculating the length of the longest path with the
addition of lines 4 & 5. These lines alter the reported cost
for vertices which are checkpoints. Due to the max opera-
tion on line 7, the overridden cost for a checkpointed vertex
will only be considered if there are no alternative routes.
Due to the topologically ordered iteration of the conven-
tional algorithm, these values will properly flow down to
descendents as before. As such, this subroutine will report
the longest path in a graph where the checkpoint and all its
redundant ancestors are removed.
Lemma 9. Our algorithm correctly calculates the worst-
case execution time of candidate vertices.
Proof. A failure can only occur before or after a checkpoint
is created. The algorithm calculates the execution time for
the worst-case failures for both these cases (Algorithm 1
lines 8 & 9). It then uses the worst of these (Algorithm 1
line 10), and performs these calculations correctly (Lemmas
6, 7 & 8).
Proof of correctness
Theorem 1. Our algorithm returns all e↵ective optimal
checkpoints if any exist.
Proof. The algorithm searches all potential e↵ective optimal
checkpoints (Lemma 5) and correctly calculates the worst-
case execution time for these candidates (Lemma 9) and
only stores and returns vertices whose cost is the smallest
of the candidates checked (Algorithm 1 lines 11 to 18).
5.2 Complexity
We show that the worst-case time complexity of our algo-
rithm is O(n(n + m)), where n is the number of vertices
in the graph and m is the number of edges. This is based
on the complexity of the outer algorithm function and the
subroutine it calls.
Lemma 10. The complexity of Subroutine 1 is O(m+ n).
Proof. The complexity of the subroutine is determined by
the complexity of max operation finding the largest incom-
ing vertex for every vertex in the graph, and the complexity
of the iteration over each vertex.
The iteration in its worst-case considers every vertex in
the graph, making it O(n). The max operation only consid-
ers the incoming edges to each vertex. This means that in
the worst-case each edge is considered only once across the
entire iteration, making this operation O(m). The overall
complexity of the subroutine is the sum of these two com-
plexities, O(n+m).
Theorem 2. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n(n+m)).
Proof. The complexity defining operation in the algorithm
is the iteration over the vertices in the critical path. In the
worst-case, the critical path contains every vertex in the
graph, making this operation O(n).
Inside this iteration, the most complex operation is the
call to Subroutine 1, which has complexity O(n+m), mak-
ing the overall complexity the product of these two com-
plexities, which is O(n(n+m)).
6 Evaluation
In this section we discuss the potential implications and
caveats of the application of our proposed mechanism its
current form. We also describe the setup used to produce
the simulated results discussed.
6.1 Profiling & Simulation Setup
To evaluate our approach and algorithms, we profiled the
execution of queries from the TPC-H [13] benchmark on
MonetDB. The profile additionally provides the query plan
graphs used in the execution of the queries themselves. Out-
put from this profiling is used to annotate the query plan
graphs with the size and time parameters used in our mod-
els.
In this profiling and simulation we use queries from the
TPC-H benchmark as they are easily accessible. These
queries are not candidates for our checkpointing mechanism
due to the insignificant cost of re-execution [9, 11]. These
queries should not be considered examples of long running
queries; however, they are suitable stand-ins to demonstrate
the potential of our approach.
For profiling, we ran MonetDB (July 2015 SP2) on a ma-
chine with a Intel Core i5-2500 CPU, with 16 GB of RAM,
using the TPC-H benchmark at scale factor 1. The queries
are executed in a warm-up run before profiling to allow the
database to load the relevant tables into memory. Each
query is run individually with no other load on the sys-
tem, and profiled using the MonetDB “stethoscope” profil-
ing tool. This profile records intermediate data sizes exe-
cution times for each operation executed within the query
plan.
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We ran an implementation of our single checkpoint selec-
tion algorithm against the abridged graphs annotated with
this profile. This produces a checkpoint plan containing the
single optimal checkpoint for each query.
For comparison we also considered checkpoints produced
by a naive checkpointing scheme that creates checkpoints,
including all intermediate results that have been produced
at the halfway mark of execution, but excluding any that
are not required for future operations. This scheme guar-
antees that the maximum possible amount of work lost due
to failure is 50% of the normal execution time of the query.
Therefore the worst-case execution time with a single fail-
ure will be 150% of the normal execution of a single query.
This provides a consistent 33% reduction in total worst-case
execution time in the presence of a single failure; compared
to having to re-execute the query from scratch, instead of
200% in the case of repeating it.
Using the profiled query plan and our execution model
we also calculate:
• The worst-case execution time of the query using the
re-execution strategy
• The worst-case execution time of the query using our
single optimal checkpoints
• The size of the single optimal checkpoint
• The size of the naive checkpoint
• The worst-case execution time improvement of our sin-
gle checkpoints vs query re-execution
• The e↵ectiveness of our single checkpoints compared to
the naive checkpointing scheme
The results of our profiling & simulation work is presented
in Table 1. Queries 14, 16, 19 and 20 were omitted as they
would not run correctly with the “stethoscope” profiling
tool.
6.2 Discussion
While our algorithm is only a first step towards selective
checkpointing for intra-query fault tolerance, it provides
some insights about the potential of our novel approach
of using algorithms that place checkpoints considering the
global topology of query plan graphs.
Figure 2 shows the percentage reduction in worst-case
execution time predicted when using our checkpointing al-
gorithm for a selection of TPC-H queries compared to the
time taken to re-execute. We compare this to the naive
checkpointing scheme that provides a 33% reduction in to-
tal execution time. Using only a single checkpoint we see
that the execution time saving varies significantly depend-
ing on the query run. Some queries exhibit a reduction by
nearly as much as 30%, while others are predicted to gain
by less than 1%. Queries 13 and 22 show protection close to
the 33% o↵ered by the naive scheme, but consume less than
50% and 1% of the checkpoint size required by the naive
scheme respectively. This shows that for a subset of queries,
saving even just a single checkpoint can provide significant
protection to queries. This is similar to the behaviour seen
in Ivanova et al. [9] where their recycled intermediates only
provide benefit to a subset of queries.
Figure 3 compares the e↵ectiveness of the single check-
point for each TPC-H query compared to the naive check-
points. This calculation extrapolates the percentage saving
Figure 2: Predicted worst-case time saving for TPC-H
queries with a optimal single checkpoint compared to query
re-execution.
Figure 3: E↵ectiveness of single vs naive checkpoints.
provided for checkpoint size and compares the di↵erence
between the two schemes to provide the same level of pro-
tection. Values below 1 indicate that the single checkpoint
is less e↵ective than the naive scheme, while greater values
indicate that the single checkpoint provided greater protec-
tion per unit space. This chart again shows that the be-
haviour di↵ers for the di↵erent TPC-H queries. Queries 4
and 9 show no result as they provided little or no reduction
in execution time. This identifies that these queries have no
e↵ective single checkpoints and require multiple checkpoints
to provide coverage. In addition to the savings shown by
Figure 2, this chart shows that while the single checkpoint
for some queries did not provide a large reduction in exe-
cution time, the reduction that was provided was done so
e ciently compared to the naive scheme. Query 11 only
provided a 2.9% reduction in execution time, but was able
to do it with a fraction of the intermediate data that the
naive scheme was extrapolated to require.
This e↵ectiveness evaluation is optimistic about the e -
ciency of the naive scheme, as it does not account for the
additional overhead that would be required to save multi-
ple intermediates. We can not assume the e↵ectiveness of a
single checkpoint can be directly extrapolated to coverage
provided for a whole query. However, our results still sug-
gest that the approach of more selectively checkpointing a
small fixed number of vertices could be capable of reducing
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Table 1: Table of simulation results
TPC-H Repeat Query Single Checkpoint Single Checkpoint Single Checkpoint) Naive Checkpoint
Query Time (µs) Time (µs) (% reduction) Size (MB) Size (MB)
1 5558090 5051882 9.1 28.2 56.4
2 258388 256650 0.7 0.8 9.2
3 707364 706751 0.1 0.1 96.7
4 979034 978770 0 0 122.5
5 1345364 1131621 15.9 4.3 153.0
6 596478 594369 0.4 4.2 210.1
7 2074210 2055670 0.9 18.4 329.9
8 810992 810138 0.1 0.2 218.2
9 12238168 12234414 0 10.9 29.9
10 840094 803552 4.3 0.4 41.0
11 171628 166574 2.9 0 30.8
12 828064 820831 0.9 25.9 293.6
13 10082486 7103963 29.5 14.6 29.3
15 300032 290238 3.3 1.1 59.5
17 1067854 1056876 1 0.2 118.1
18 22558 21153 6.2 28.6 28.6
21 2778552 2703561 2.7 42.9 208.9
22 226294 158949 29.8 0.1 2.3
checkpointing overheads while providing su cient resilience
against failure during long-running queries.
7 Conclusions
Existing approaches to providing intra-query fault tolerance
su↵er from significant overheads, being too restricted to
apply to the general structure of query plan graphs used
with in-memory column-oriented databases. Improvements
in this field will contribute to providing practical high-
availability solutions for big data applications.
Our model and approach are not restricted by schema
or query plan complexity, and as such can be applied to
any analytic database workload. Additionally, our model
and approach can be used in other (non-database) parallel
computing applications when a task graph is fully known in
advance of execution.
Despite our single checkpoint selection algorithm only be-
ing a first step towards providing checkpoint planning, it
shows promise for the approach of e ciently selecting check-
points from a query plan graph based on a fixed budget due
to the reductions in checkpoint overhead. This represents
a novel approach compared to existing schemes, which can
produce a variable number of checkpoints but rely on sim-
plifications to achieve acceptable complexity in doing so.
Currently, our algorithm is limited to only selecting a
single checkpoint, so necessary future work involves extend-
ing our algorithm to consider producing checkpoint plans
containing multiple checkpoints. An optimistic extrapola-
tion of our provisional results suggests that continuing our
global optimisation approach may enable both greater ex-
ecution time savings with smaller checkpointing overheads
than existing solutions. Work is ongoing to implement our
mechanism in MonetDB to provide an experimental evalu-
ation and comparison of our approach.
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